, which can autonomously organize networks without infrastructure. VANET that consists of many community nodes is characterized by lack of guaranteed connectivity. The right operation of such a network requires nodes to cooperate on the level of packet forwarding. When a node wants to transmit a message to another node, the message can be opportunistically routed through relay nodes under the hypothesis that each node is willing to participate to forward. However, nodes belonging to different communities may choose selfish behavior when considering their limited resources such as energy, storage space and so on. Their purpose is maximizing their own payoff. Thus, a new routing algorithm specifying certain message forwarding strategies is a necessity in such networks. In this work, we study main properties of sparse VANET. We presents a routing algorithm based on the evolutionary game, Multi-Community Evolutionary Game Routing algorithm (MCEGR), to solve the selfish routing problem. The theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the proposed routing has better feasibility and effectiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
VANET [1] (Vehicle Ad hoc Network) is an open mobile Ad hoc network composed by the mutual communication between vehicles or between the vehicle and the fixed access point. It has a very high application prospect and research value. Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are expected to support a large spectrum of mobile distributed applications such as traffic alert dissemination, dynamic route planning to context-aware advertisement and file sharing [3] - [6] . The main features of VANET are rapid change of topology, selforganization, and regularity of nodes movement. In [7] , authors indicated that VANET is different from conventional ad hoc wireless networks. A VANET not only experiences rapid changes in wireless link connections, but may also have to deal with different types of network densities. For example, VANETs on freeways or urban areas are more likely to form highly dense networks during bumper-to-bumper rush hour traffic, while VANETs are expected to experience frequent network fragmentation in sparsely populated rural freeways or during late night hours. Until now, most of VANET research has focused on analyzing routing algorithms to handle the broadcast storm problem in a highly dense network topology [8] , [9] . However, for various topology of VANET, we believe that the sparse VANET problem is also a significant research for developing a efficient routing mechanism.
A common solution to overcome intermittent connectivity of sparse VANET is to use epidemic routing, which is flooding-based in nature, as nodes continuously replicate and transmit message to newly discovered contacts that don't already possess a copy of the message. Although this routing maximizes the probability of a message, it occupies a large number of network resources. Because power consumption and buffer occupation will increase with the increased number of copies. Thus we focus on two-hop relay routing scheme [10] in which a mobile that receives a copy of the packet from the source can only forward it if this mobile meets the destination.
Many routing strategies in VANET have been well studied so far, and several efficient routing protocols have been proposed under the hypothesis that each vehicle is willing to forward messages for others [11] , [12] . However, when vehicles are controlled by bounded rational entities, such as human or organization [13] , some nodes is self-interested and may be unwilling to help others to forward messages. For example, in order to conserve power, buffer and computing resources, a selfinterested vehicle node may be reluctant in the cooperation that is not directly beneficial to it [14] . From [15] , we can consider the nodes in VANET are bounded rational. Because they do not have capacity to understand everything, but only have limited time to make decisions.
Packet forwarding failure is far more critical in multihop networks, as has been demonstrated by Tanachaiwiwat et al. [16] where the research indicates that only a small percentage f misbehaving nodes has a large impact on the network. In a mobile ad-hoc network, throughput is reduced by 20% if 10% of the nodes in that network misbehave [17] . From the above data it becomes obvious that a small number of misbehaving nodes creates large problems in the network. Eventually, the selfish of nodes will lead to the decrease of VANET throughout. Traditional tools to model ad hoc networks are not very good at describing a high level property like cooperation [18] because human behavioral and social factors seem to be at the heart of these new types of problems. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is an efficient method to solve the problem of selfish nodes in wireless networks. The relationship between nodes is not simply cooperative or non-cooperative, but a kind of complex dynamic cooperative and non-cooperative. In general, there are multiple communities of nodes in VANET, such as taxi community and bus community. By cooperation among communities, the performance of data delivery can be significantly improved. The communities of nodes are bounded rational and aim to maximize their benefits. Thus, the rewards and the cost have to be weighed and satisfying decisions are required.
In this paper, we focus on the cooperative behavior among multiple communities of nodes in VANET. The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follow:
 Characterize the possible equilibrium of VANET multiple communities forwarding dynamics within a multi-community evolutionary game theoretical framework.  An asymmetric multi-community evolutionary game model is formulated in order to analyze the competition in the same community and between different communities in VANET. The asymmetric two-community replicator dynamics proposed by Daniel Friedman (1998) is quoted to analyze the evolutionary behavior characteristics of each community. The existence conditions of ESS are derived. Through the experiments demonstrate that the solution of this game is depending on the rewards of each community. The rest of this paper is organized as the following. Section II reviews related work. In Section III, we introduced the relevant knowledge of evolutionary game theory. In Section IV, we formalized the network model and multi-community evolutionary game model, and then derived existence condition of ESS. Besides that, a new routing algorithm was proposed, and called MCEGR. We showed the two-community replicator dynamic convergence to equilibrium. The numerical experiments were performed to investigate the effects of rewards in Section V. Finally, our conclusions were given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In wireless networks, the selfish problems have been studied. The two main solutions are incentive mechanism and game theory method [19] - [33] . Many literatures presented many incentive solutions to encourage nodes to forward. In [19] , Shevade et al. first studied the impact of selfish behaviors in DTNs, and developed an incentiveaware routing protocol that allowed selfish nodes to maximize their individual utilities while conforming to tit-for-tat constraints. In [20] , Zhu et al. proposed a secure multilayer credit-based incentive scheme for DTNs affiliated with selfish nodes. In [14] , Rongxing Lu et al. proposed a practical incentive protocol, called Pi, such that when a source node sent a bundle message, it also attached some incentive on the bundle, which was not only attractive but also fair to all participating DTN nodes.
Furthermore, game theoretic approaches have been applied in routing of wireless networks [21] . For example, in [22] , Lei Yin et al. proposed a model, Pay-for-Gain (PFG), based on game theory and loan-credit theory. In [23] , the optimal stochastic control of packet forwarding in DTN was proposed. The author in [24] analyzed the competition and cooperation behavior of the individual nodes in DTN using game theory. D. Niyato et al. [25] , the author considered the problem of cooperation among heterogeneous groups in DTN from a coalitional game perspective. M. Naserian and K. Tepe [26] introduced a game theoretic method, called forwarding dilemma game (FDG), which controlled routing overhead in dense multihop wireless ad hoc networks. Recently, computer scientists have acknowledged the advantages of evolutionary game theory which were good methods to resolve the selfness problem of networks.
In [27] , the authors used evolutionary game theory to study a large population of mobiles forming a sparse ad hoc network, where mobiles competed with their neighbors on the access to a radio channel. They studied the impact of the level of energy in the battery on the aggressiveness of the access policy of mobiles at equilibrium. Literature [28] studied an evolutionary game theoretic mechanism for adaptive and stable application deployment in cloud computing environment. Felegyhazi et al. [29] used game theory in combination with graph theory to investigate and prove the conditions under which cooperation can evolve in the network. The authors concluded that the probability of full network cooperation is very small. Nonetheless, as the authors point out, local subsets of cooperating nodes may exist. Actually, this model relies on a dependency loop. A node may not be able to know its dependency loop in a fully distributed network.
In our paper, the multi-community evolutionary game model is derived from one-species evolutionary game. While there are several existing evolutionary game models, most of them are used in economic studies. Recent years, evolutionary game was also applied in wireless networks. D. Niyato and E. Hossain [30] presented two algorithms, namely, population evolution and reinforcement-learning algorithms for network selection and formulated the game to model the competition among groups of users in the different service areas in heterogeneous wireless networks. Janusz Kusyk et al. [31] , presented a new algorithm, called NSEG，combining forced-based genetic algorithm (FGA) with game theory. NSEG run at each node of MANET, autonomously made movement decisions.Marcin Seredynski and Pascal Bouvry [32] introduced a Prisoner's Dilemma-based model of packet forwarding and next using an evolutionary game-theoretical approach that could potentially form a distributed, reputation-based cooperation enforcement system in MANETs. C. A. Kamhoua et al. used EGT framework to address the problem of selfishness, and proposed the use of distributed algorithms that were able to force selfish nodes to cooperate and forward packets [33] .
Evolutionary game was also applied to noncooperative forwarding control of DTN in [34] . Different from [34] , it only considered one-species situation. Specifically, we propose a multi-community evolutionary game model to control the VANET nodes of communities to help forward messages in sparse VANETs. In fact, it is clear that there are many communities of different rewards level in VANETs.
III. BACKGROUND: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
Game theory studies strategic selection of behaviors in interactions among rational players. In a game, given a set of strategies, each player strives to find a strategy that optimizes its own payoff depending on the other's strategy choices. Game theory seeks such strategies for all players as a solution, called Nash equilibrium (NE), where no players can gain extra payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) originated as an application of the mathematical theory of games to biological contexts, arising from the realization that frequency dependent fitness introduces a strategic aspect to evolution. Now, EGT has aroused interest of economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and philosopher. There are three reasons that scientists are interested in EGT. First, the notion of evolution can be interpreted as different contexts. In this paper, 'Evolution ' refers to changes in relaying messages over time. Second, EGT assumes that the players are bounded rationality, which was more appropriate for the real world. Third, EGT, as an explicitly dynamic theory, provides an important element missing from the traditional theory.
Evolutionary game theory came from Darwinian biological evolution theory. In the process of biological evolution, different populations compete for the same living resources in the same living environment. The result of the competition is those species who get higher fitness survive, and species that get lower fitness are eliminated. This is called selecting the superior and eliminating the inferior. The assumptions of rationality and common knowledge used in game theory are relaxed in EGT. Unlike game theory, where players are intelligent, rational and choose strategies, in EGT, players are programmed to some strategies in the game. Players are randomly and repeatedly drawn from large populations and play the same pure or mixed strategies. In this situation, players can not only get the decision information with their own experience, but also make decision by observing the strategies of other players. Besides that, it is possible for players to obtain decision information from the history of species distribution. In general, they imitate high-fitness strategy in the evolution process, while low-fitness strategy is eliminated. In general, EGT considers two major evolutionary mechanisms: mutation, which injects varieties on genes, and selection, which favors some varieties over others based on their fitness to the environment. Mutation is considered in the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), which is a refinement of NE. Selection is considered in the replicator dynamics (RD) model.
An ESS is a strategy that cannot be gradually invaded by any other strategy in the population. It is assumed that the initial player's strategy (population state) is y, and mutation strategy is mut. When a player plays strategy y * , the probability of its opponent playing the mutation strategy is  . Then y * is ESS if the following condition holds: . FD describes the evolution in a population of various strategies in which each player follows the following imitation protocol: after every interaction it switches to any strategy which achieved more payoff than its own with probability proportionate to the payoff difference. In the resulting dynamics, the portion of a strategy in the population grows at a rate that is proportional to the average payoff of the population.
IV. MULTI-COMMUNITY EVOLUTIONARY GAME ROUTING

ALGORITHM
In this section, we firstly introduce the VANET model used in this paper and present a two-community evolutionary game model for message forwarding in VANET. According to the following analytic process, a new routing algorithm is presented to solve multicommunity routing problem.
A. System Model and assumption
In VANETs, there are two main communication methods vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 [35] . A vehicle is usually resource-unlimited, while the equipped OBU communication device is considered resource-limited, i.e., buffer and power consumption [36] . Therefore, the nodes may be selfinterested. These selfish nodes may be unwilling to receive messages, destinations of which are not they.
Since the considered VANET environment is sparse, they can communicate only when they move into the transmission range of each other, which means a communication contact. Each node can decide whether to participate to transmit message or not. The first node that delivers the message to the destination receives the rewards of its own community level from a trusted authority. It is assumed that the rewards are given to the trusted authority by the source in advance, when the source wants to transmit its message to relay nodes. However, there can be multiple communities and sourcedestination pairs in VANET. According to requirement of source node, the rewards for the successful node of each community are different. Three assumptions are to be made to simplify the formulation.
1) The inter-contact time between two nodes follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ > 0, which has discussed in [37] . 2) There are two communities and one pair of source-destination in VANET. The source s and destination d are regarded as static. The number of nodes in each community is unknown. Consider that nodes of each community are distributed over a plan following a Poisson distribution with parameter γ > 0, which is used by [34] .
3) The message that is transmitted is relevant during some time τ . That is, there is a single message generated from a source at time t = 0, with many copies at time t =τ , spreading in VANET. In the rest of this paper, we will use the terms "population" and "species" to refer to the VANET community.
B. Two-Community Evolutionary Game Formulation
In this section, we analyze evolutionary game model for VANETs with multiple communities. These communities compete for rewards.
In [38] , D. Friedman classified the possible asymmetric behavior for one and two dimensional models. Symmetric game only considers one type of population, and payoff of each player is symmetric. While the asymmetric game considers multiple types of player, payoff of different community player is asymmetric, e.g., there are many types of communities in VANET, and the utilities of these communities are different.
Evolutionary game is used to study the competition among nodes from the same community and different communities in VANET two-hop routing game. The relays are the players of the game, who need to make decision on whether to relay message that is generated at the source s with destination d. The evolutionary game starts when the message is generated by when the source s and ends after time τ. In the process of this message being transferred from s to d, s could encounter relay nodes from two species. Nodes from the same species would compete with each other to forward copies to d, so do nodes from different species. Since in VANETs it is difficult for a node to know how many nodes are willing to forward messages, including the nodes of the same species and different species. To solve this problem, one of our hypotheses is introduced at the end of system model assumptions, i.e., assumptions 3).
For simplicity, consider two communities in VANET, and moreover, a single static source and destination. Let Pop1 (resp. Pop2) be the community 1(resp. community 2). The set I1 (resp. I2) is the set of nodes in Pop1 (resp. Pop2).Let us assume that the difference between two species is the rewards. For example, the source is more familiar with one species, so it will let the trusted authority give more rewards to the successful node of that species. In the other words, if one node of the other species succeeds, it would receive fewer rewards. It is obvious that the species given higher rewards is more willing to relay the message.
The multi-community evolutionary game for our paper can be described as follows.
 Players. For all communities, each node who can decide whether to help to relay message is a player of the game.  Population. The populations in this game are the communities of VANET. The number of each population is unknown. In order to establish formula, we assume that the number of Pop1 (resp. Pop2) is m (resp. n)  Strategy. The set of strategies is S= {p, q}, while p means the node will receive and delivery the message, but q is opposite situation.  Payoff. The payoff of a player is determined by its utility, which is the difference between the reward of that strategy and the resource cost. The payoff of the node not only depends on the strategy played by some N random nodes from the same community, but also the number of communities that participate to the game. From the above descriptions, it is easy to know the condition when two communities exist in VANET.
Let X: = {(x, x-) | x+ x-= 1} and Y: = {(y, y-) | y+ y-= 1} respectively be the set of probability distributions of Pop1 and Pop2 over the S pure strategies. If a node of Pop1 (resp. Pop2) encounters the source, it attempts transmission with probability x (resp. y ). In this game x and y also represent the proportion of Pop1 and Pop2 playing the strategy p.
From the previous assumptions, the probability that the node relays the copy to the destination within time  is given by 1 Q   where (1 ) .
(1) Thus, when there only exists Pop1 or Pop2, the probability that the node receives the rewards, if it plays strategy p is (see [24] ) ' ,1
where α = 1-Qτ. We first consider the competition among the same species, which is similar with [38] . The competition between two species is taken as the competition between two successful nodes from each species. The probability of a player choosing strategy p receives the rewards is ,1
,2
(
The payoff of a player can be computed from the:
Where g is the power consumption and CM is the buffer occupation cost. G 1 (resp. G 2 ) is the reward for the node of Pop1(resp. Pop2) delaying the message of source s to destination d , which is decided by the trusted authority. However, once a node does not participate in forwarding the message, it can save its own resource and not receive any rewards from the trusted authority. In another word, the payoff function for playing strategy q is zero, i.e., 2 (
2) The Pure strategy q dominates the pure strategy p, if and only if 
2) The Pure strategy q dominates the pure strategy p, if and only if 2 
The similar proof of the above theorems is reported in [37] .
It is observed that the two-community evolutionary game has the ESS if and only if the third condition of theorem 1 and 2 are satisfied.
C. Two-community replicator dynamics
In a dynamic evolutionary game, an individual from a population, who is able to replicate itself through the process of mutation and selection, is called replicator. In this case, a replicator with a higher payoff can reproduce itself faster [30] . The game as described is repeated, and in each period (i.e., in each generation), a player observes the utility (i.e. payoff) of other players in the same species. Then, in the next period, the player adopts a strategy that gives a higher payoff.
In the case of two species, the payoff functions are given by (6) and (7). Formally, the two populations' replicator dynamics are given by 12 12 (1 )( ( , ) ( , )) We can then drive the following expressions are
According to the second assumption in section III, the probability that there exist n nodes during an evolutionary game is given by the following distribution:
Hence, (12) and (13) can also be written as 
The solution of (15) is the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) (x * , y * ). The ESS (x * , y * ) can be expressed as follows:
where LambertW is the inverse function of 1 ()
When there exits ESS, the probability that each species relays message to the destination successfully is given as follow:
Finally the probability that the destination receives the message successfully is
From (2)- (5), it can be seen that the probability that individual receives rewards is irrelevant with the states of other species or the number of players of other species, but relevant with the number of players of its own species. By comparing (2) and (4), we can observe that the probability is decreased with the number of other species. Indeed, the competition is fiercer when there are more species.
If there are c species in VANET, the probability that the player of the i-th species receives rewards is
Thus the number of species increases (i.e., the number of different type species increases), the source must pay more rewards to the previous species in order to make they have the same ESS. Based on the preceding analysis and theorems, the conditions that two-community evolutionary game has ESS are:
Thus, we can learn from the VANET parameters to known whether the ESS exists.
D. Multi-community Evolutionary Game Routing
Algorithm (MCERG)
After the work ahead, in this part, we present a new routing algorithm, Multi-Community Evolutionary Game Routing (MCERG), which is based on EGT to solve the multi-community routing problem in sparse VANET.
MCEGR is a two-hop routing and appropriate for sparse VANET. According to some network parameters, MCEGR can help selfish nodes make final strategies. When multiple communities exist, the probability that an individual of single community receives the rewards is P s,i (x, y), see equation (20) . It is obvious that the probability P s,i (x, y) relatives to the number of community in VANET. In other words, the more types of populations, the competition between populations is fiercer.
In MCERG, each node stores a reward list that records the rewards of helping different communities forwarding. Table. 1 shows the reward list of nodes from community No.1. The first row is the community number of source node. For example, when a node of community NO.1 meets a source from community NO.2, the node will check its reward list to find the reward G2. According to the network parameters, the node eventually uses the following theorem 3 to determine the appropriate strategy to maximize its payoff, which makes the community in the VANET converge to a cooperative state ultimately and promoting the selfish nodes cooperating with each other. (
The pure strategy q dominates the pure strategy p, if and only
exists an unique ESS
It is easy to see that the theorem 3 is the expansion of theorem 1 and theorem 2.
Generally speaking, the main ideas of MCEGR are as followed: if the network parameters are certain, each node stores a reward list; when a node of community No.i meets the source node, it will check its reward list to get the corresponding reward value; then it will make decision by using theorem 3 to maximize its benefit; if a node plays the strategy p, it will delay the message to the destination; instead a node will refuse to delay the message when it plays the strategy q; the third situation is that the node will relay the message with probability ESS * i y , while ESS exists.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
A. Numerical settings
In order to study the convergence of the replicator dynamic, we assume the rewards of Pop1 are more than those of Pop2. In simulations, unless otherwise specified, the results have been obtained with G1 = 1.5, G2 = 1, λ = 3, γ = 3.3, g = 0.1and CM = 0.225.
B. Numerical results
In the first set of experiments, we simulated the replicator dynamics for two species in order to evaluate their validity. Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the twocommunity replicator dynamic, under differentτ = 1, 1.1, 1.2. The corresponding value for α= 0.8009, 0.9085, 0.8743.
In Fig. 1 (a) , we respectively obtain x * = 0.4945, y * = 0.1545, and x * > y From the previous conditions of existence of ESS, we know there exists ESS, when 0.8816 < Gi < 2.4218, i =1, 2. In Fig. 5 , we compare the population distribution of any species in different incentive police Gi ∈ [0.9, 2.4], under τ = 1. From the figure, firstly we can see the replicator dynamics equation is concave and the number of players choosing strategy p is decreasing until reaches ESS, when Gi is less than or equal to 1.8. However, the replicator dynamics equation is convex and the number of players choosing strategy p is increasing until reaches ESS, when Gi is more than or equal to 2.3. As a result, ESS is higher when the rewards are more. The reason is that the more rewards, the more payoff of each player can be obtained. In the end, more players would choose strategy p to maximize their payoff. The probability that single species successfully relays message to the destination is shown in Fig. 6 . The probability keeps increasing when rewards G is increasing. Note that, the probability is nearly reaching 1 when G is 2.4. Figure 6 . the success probability of single species
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, on the basis of the characteristics of VANET and selfish nodes, we have developed corresponding network model and an evolutionary game model to formulate competition among multi-community bounded rational nodes in sparse VANET. By adopting asymmetric multi-community evolutionary game, the proposed mechanism can not only find each community's unique evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) but also provide the existence conditions of ESS. Detailed analyses have been shown that ESS of each community exists. When a community reaches its ESS, its state is stable. Compared to existing works in literature, we introduced an asymmetric multi-community evolutionary game framework and proposed a routing algorithm based on multi-community evolutionary game, or "MCEGR" for short. MCEGR is a two-hop routing, and can determine the strategy of each player depending on the network parameters. When the network parameters meet the existence conditions of ESS, the players play their own ESS to maximizing their own interests and reaching the steady state of network.
In the case when the source declare to pay some rewards to the first mobile that delivers the packet to the destination, finally mobiles of each community using corresponding strategy to forward packet in VANET.
